613 621 616 182 This internal equilibrium between charfiqin was maintained, more than by the play of (within) the jma'th, by the liff alliance system which, linking tribes, clans, communities and lineages into two rival bands, created the miracle of permitting the existence of minuscule units of this type amongst others more powerful, although the clarification of this point would take us further away from our present intentions.

614 619 701 Security in external relations was attained by the connection with the upper-level units, clan and tribe, and verified by means of their representatives and the contingents of armed men which on special occasions they had to send as irregular tribal troops in a harka, which defended group interests in any revolts or fratricidal struggles.

6446 619 The representatives of the jma'th in its external relations are locally known by the name of imgharen, and more commonly by the Arabized term aitharbi'in (the forty: sic), because each khums (one-fifth of the tribe) generally provided eight representatives (sic)[10]. These men of the aitharbi'in were generally accompanied by an escort of aith amzzyan (or aith umzzyan?)[11] who officiated both as advisers and as witnesses to the agraw or council meeting where questions of common interest were aired and examined.

721 621 613 When these questions necessitated armed expeditions outside the unit concerned, the (manpower) quota which each jma'th had to provide

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[114] 10--This makes a neat mathematical model, but in practice it is based upon a false premise, as it has been demonstrated previously that the term aitharbi'in refers in fact to "representatives of the people" and that it has nothing whatsoever to do with the notion of "forty".

[114] 11--The concept of aith umzzyan or imzzyanen, "little ones", "minors", as participants in the Rifian political system is, again, erroneous. It is only in the present paper that Blanco introduces the concept in this fashion.

628 721 they send out a couple of individuals to care for their relatives (in their absence) and tell them what has happened, and by day, they have to feed them, after which, once this is done, they start the march toward the enemy group in order to deliver the coup de main either at once or through careful skirmishing.

There is no top command, for, as the objective is clear, it is not needed. All that must be done is to write finis to the enemy. Individual desertion is shameful, booty is eagerly anticipated, and members of the war-party do not worry about the fact that there are neither rearguard services nor defense.

B) Harkas and their Formation (fragmentary):

[701] [626] [689] The obligation to serve in a harka or war-party was general and accepted by all, and avoidance of harka duty was an object of censure and sanction. Any and all groups which were threatened (both internally and externally) provided variable contingents which were activated periodically. Until protectorate times, punitive expeditions organized by the Moroccan Sultans to chastise recalcitrant tribesmen were augmented by auxiliary harkas made up from the tribes through [648] whose territory the expeditions passed. A good example was the foray undertaken by Bushta al-Baghdadi, one of the fin de siècle commanders of the Moroccan army, against the pirates of the Ibuqquyen in 1898[4]. 701 More recently, 'Abd al-Krim solicited harkas for individual engagements; he maintained a reduced contingent, which was periodically increased, under arms. The system was one of partial mobilization with relief contingents, the number and amount of which were fixed by 'Abd al-Krim. Their recruitment and provisions were handled by their

701 own jma'ths; they were headed by men of their own localities; and 'Abd al-Krim only reserved for himself the right to nominate individuals in his confidence for top positions[5].

[619] The contingents of each tribe were headed by the notables of that tribe, and were instructed independently within the whole harka

619 agglomerate. The tribal notables received news of the objectives
726 they had to attain; they took their contingents into battle; and
701 afterwards, they abandoned the field and brought their harkas home....
[621] Through their representatives in the agraw, the jma'ths knew the
[623] contingent which was requested, and they made the division and nomin-
701 ated the chiefs[6]. There were both volunteers and conscripts; but in
[702] each house, one man had to stay at home. An amghar or the amghar was the elected warchief, and he established his contingent....He did not
[621] abandon his house or agricultural tasks or coerce anyone to fight[7],
[623] and the jma'th saw to an equitable distribution of men under arms at all times. Only shurfa, old men, boys and individuals with physical defects were exempt from harka service.

726 Attempts were made to respect geographical order, and each contingent was called upon to engage in combat only on its natural front. The order of battle was traditionally known, and was answerable to political necessity. Coexistence was easier for harka members on their natural fronts, of course, in their own land; resistance was more effective, displacements were more rapid and dispersion was less serious. Knowing the country perfectly, they could send groups to defend passes or watersheds or gorges in relays, each one two or three hours behind the last, so that later arrivals could increase the

726 strength of those who were first on the spot, and so that the points which were most threatened could be easily and quickly reinforced. [182] [701] The dissemination of contingents was imposed by geographical factors (i.e. by the extreme poverty of an area which is excessively compartmented and rought country), by political ones (i.e. lack of a single head at the top of the chain of command other than individuals of purely local prestige, and a recruitment system which set limits on the employment of large units) and even by technical ones (i.e. the European notion of reducing the defense of fixed points of strategic interest, as well as in finding them, is difficult for Rifians to assimilate, for they themselves merely wait in their hilltop houses, etc.)[8].

C) Rifian Alliances (fragmentary):

619 628 181 [602] The Rif was a mosaic of independent tribes, gnawed at by internal disputes in an inhospitable land. It was a powder-keg of individual personalities who placated misfortunes with more misfortunes, with misery, envy and egotism; each one of these men were followed by minuscule groups of kinsmen and partisans, with no tie greater to oppose an invader than their own ambition and convenience....

619 There was in the Rif, however, a certain internal equilibrium by which small tribes like the Targist, Thafarsith and Aith Wurishik[9] could persist, even though surrounded by powerful neighbors.

619 616 [648] Alliances seem the logical and necessary step to which the Rifians had recourse when threatened by superior powers, such as that of the Sultans. The main significance of alliances lies in defense against a common danger, as well as in its concomitant, mutual aid;

614 648 in the tribal political organization and entangle it badly, a tribe which up to now appears to be the least clear or tangible of all those studied and known so far.[105]

687 [671] [829] As European states do, this document imposes a public duty upon the natives of the territory, for they must defend their tribal lands with their weapons in their hands; and it even includes punishment for anyone who shrinks from staying in the danger zone. While, [682] however, among Europeans such a punishment is moderate, we see that [443] among Rifians, by the importance of the fine (2000 duros) the penalty is as high as that for murder (i.e. in the market), for this amount is equal to that stipulated as ddiyith[106] in two qanuns already examined, that of Aith 'Abdallah and that of Aith 'Adhiya.

Thus, then, an offense against patriotism constitutes a crime in itself, and it is sanctioned analogously upon the coward and deserter as homicide is upon the murderer.

577 574 671 This may explain the virtues, such as courage and hospitality which we have so frequently seen attributed to the Rifians; for it was precisely their clear-cut laws and rude (i.e. rough and ready) custom which urged them on, stimulated them (see the qanun of the jma'th of Thamasind for hospitality) and which perforce they practiced.[107]

671 701 [702] 11. A QANUN OF HARKA--AITH WARYAGHAR:

It is obligatory for all the qa'ids and members of a harka that each one of them must present himself in fixed turns, which each one must take without losing a day. Whoever does not obey this order, except in the following cases, such as illness[108], and nobody may go on leave during his turn without authorization from the kabir al-mahalla.[109]

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Fines to be imposed:

Harka members: for each day of absence, two (days to be served) in the harka, and a fine of 2 duros.

Qa'ids of 25 men: the same, with a fine of 3 duros.

Qa'ids of 50 men: the same, with a fine of 4 duros.

Qa'ids of 100 men: the same, with a fine of 5 duros.

Qa'ids of 200 men: the same, with a fine of 6 duros.

This is an order emanating from the fortunate Makhzin (i.e. of 'Abd al-Krim). May God protect it. In Targhzut on Ramadan 23, 1344 (March 8, 1926). By order of 'Abd al-Karim bin Ziyan.[110]

12. DOCUMENT OF EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF TAXES[111]:

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Praise be to the one God. The blessings of God be upon our (lord) Muhammad, his family and friends.

It shall be known through the present document that we, taking into consideration the services rendered to the Makhzin and the taxes which because of hospitable attentions with warlike objectives (holy war) weigh upon the bearers, the sons of the late Si Ahmad bin Si 'Ali al-Tawti are exempted by us from the contributions concerned....The 'amil, in virtue of this, orders that they not be asked of them....And the peace.

Safar 18 of the year 1341 (October 10, 1922). Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, may God be with him, amen. (Signed and sealed).

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13. QANUN OF THE SEA--AITH WARYAGHAR[112]:

A) The Boat Owner:

He owns the boat (agharrabu, pl. igharruba)[113], acquired by transfer, sale, already used or repaired by carpenters on the beach, of whom there are still a few[114].

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3



The pattern of colonization was different in the French zone.[28] Drawn by the classic motivations of the time—trade, new land, promise of quick profits, adventure, and dissatisfaction with conditions at home—French colonists poured into Morocco by the thousands. In each of the main areas of *colon* activity—i.e., the plains of the lower Sebou, the Gharb, and the area around Oujda—European colonization necessitated displacement of native farmers and pastoralists. The resulting confusion and conflict were important factors in the development of Moroccan nationalism.[29] In 1955 French settlers owned about 7 per cent of Morocco's productive land, but this land was exceptionally fertile and accounted for 40 per cent of the national income from agriculture.[30] In comparison, the extent of agricultural development in Spanish Morocco seems negligible.

If rural colonization was negligible in Spanish Morocco, the military occupation was not. Since its inception, the Spanish protectorate functioned as a military training ground. During most of the period of effective Spanish occupation, at least 200,000 troops were stationed in the northern zone. This force included the *mehalla*, or Khalifian army, of about 10,000 native troops, and large concentrations of the Spanish army. The more accessible rural areas were patrolled by the *makhzaniya*, or rural police, a force patterned after the Spanish *guardia civil*. Rifians, especially the Aith Wariyaghar, were eager to serve in one of the military forces, and the Spanish, who valued their obedience and hardiness, were just as eager to enlist them. Rifian troops formed a substantial part of Franco's forces during the Spanish Civil War. Military service under Spanish officers or "instructors" led to acceptance of some aspects of Iberian culture. The most striking evidence of such acceptance is the widespread use of Spanish as a second language in the Rif.

Contact between Spaniards and the rural population took place also at the scattered outposts of the Delegación de Asuntos Indígenas. At the head of each outpost was an army officer called an *interventor*. His function was to act as overseer of tribal government. Most *intervenciones* had a school, with a Spanish teacher, and a few had doctors and veterinarians. The Spaniards led a rather sedentary life, and did not attempt to intervene in the routine events of tribal life. But they could impose fines or make arrests if necessary, and the tribal authorities were obliged to implement Spanish directives if they wished to remain in power.

In Morocco, as in most colonial areas, the extent of road building and improvement in communications is a reliable measure of European influence. In Spanish Morocco the first roads were constructed to facilitate pacification and administration. Once this network was established, little effort was made to add tributary lines for more efficient movement of goods. In 1956 Spanish Morocco had about 1,000 kilometers of primary roads, but only half of this distance was surfaced. The track from Bab Taza to Alhucemas was the only durable link between the western and the eastern sector of the zone, and it was blocked for days or even

[28] M. M. Knight, *Morocco as a French Economic Venture: A Study of Open Door Imperialism* (New York: Appleton, 1937).

[29] Comité d'Action Marocaine, *Plan de réformes marocaines* (Paris: privately published, 1934).

[30] On European holdings in French Morocco, see Planche 33 b, "Exploitations rurales européennes," *Atlas du Maroc* (Rabat: Comité de Géographie du Maroc, 1958), and the "Notice explicative" that accompanies the map.

1: Coon E-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1

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able since much of it is not mountain at all, but open rolling country.

The Riffians are tough fighters. They won Spain for Franco, on a promise of freedom given them on the Yellow Plain of Ktama. One of them, ʿAbd el-Krīm's jailer, once told me that he gave the Christian prisoners dirt mixed in their bread; this is nothing to what the Christians have done to them, which, out of deference to the sensitivity of my readers, I shall not print here. Needless to say, the Riffians buried no one alive in anthills, nor have their women hacked any prisoners to shreds. Having never visited the Pathans, I cannot make the same denial for them with as much conviction, but until shown otherwise I shall continue to believe that these tales come out of the same volume of fiction.

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Reading about the Pathans, however, reminds me much of the Riffians, with a few differences. The Riffians live in wetter and more fertile country, with more vegetation, and, although good Muslims, make little display of their religious feelings. They keep the fast and all the main feasts, adding a few of their own. The older men refuse to smoke, and some even refuse tea. They confined Jews to a few coastal settlements, notably Bades and Melilla, while Christians were not admitted at all, before the days of ʿAbd el-Krīm, who let in Gordon Canning, Vincent Sheean, and a few others without demanding previous conversion. One is told that the Pathans are "fanatical," but this again may be a form of general xenophobia channeled through the symbolic mechanism of religion.

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The Pathans also are organized in tribes, divided into subtribes, partitioned into sections, split into clans, which are made up of patrilineal extended families.[9] Each family, clan, section, and subtribe has its head man, who represents his group in the *jirga,* or representative council of the group just above him. Like the Asht Arbaʿin, these councils convene to attempt to settle matters of dispute between their constituent members. Irrigation quarrels and cattle rustling are the chief business of the smaller jirgas, while adultery and murder draw the full tribal council, presided over by its chief officer, the khan. Like the amīn of a Kabyle village, he is often no more than a moderator. In case of murder, the killer flees the tribal territory at

[9] See H. Hörhager, *Die Volkstumsgrundlagen der Indischen nordwest-grenz Provinz* (Heidelberg, 1943). M. Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies* (London, 1825). C. Collin Davies, *The Problem of the Northwest Frontier, 1890-1908.*